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9Private vs. Public Sector: Discrimination





The assimilation of immigrants and their children is a burning issue
in France. Governments build a large part of their policies on the la-
bor market. The public sector is reputed to integrate minorities better
because of its entrance exams and pay-scales. In this paper, a com-
parison of the public and private sectors shows that second-generation
immigrants are not treated equally. Those of African descent are dis-
criminated against in both sectors even though selection issues are
controlled for, whereas the wages of those of South European origin
are similar to those of the French.
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France is traditionally a country of immigration due to its colonial history.
The children of immigrants acquire French nationality by birth but real prob-
lems in the assimilation of this population are clearly visible, as the events
of November 2005 have shown. Riots in the suburbs of big cities and partic-
ularly Paris, where many immigrants and their children live, showed up the
assimilation issues in French society. Since this period, governments have
tried to introduce policies to improve assimilation into the school system and
the labor market. An administrative authority has been created to encour-
age equality between citizens and ﬁght discrimination and some evidence has
been collected of discrimination against workers of foreign origin in compa-
nies’ hiring processes (Duguet et al., 2007).
In economics, discrimination can be deﬁned as diﬀerential treatment be-
tween two persons whose characteristics are similar. In the labor market,
three main forms are observable. The ﬁrst appears in the hiring procedure,
the second concerns the level of responsibility in the ﬁrm and the last is the
wage gap between the reference population and the minority. The latter is
easier to measure because of the availability of census databases and the lit-
erature is rich in theory concerning the wage diﬀerential. Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973) introduced a wage-decomposition: in which the cause of the
gap which cannot be explained by diﬀerences in observable characteristics
the cause is considered to be discrimination. This method is currently used
in the empirical literature, as well as the introduction of dummies to evaluate
the eﬀect on wages of belonging to a minority group.
Concerning second-generation immigrants, monographs have been writ-
ten on wage discrimination. In France, this subject is essentially treated
by sociologists due to the lack of census data. Indeed the law forbids the
collecting of data on ethnic origin. INSEE, the French National Institute
of Statistics, introduced questions about the nationality of parents in their
interviews or questionnaires only two years ago. Two recent studies, Aeber-
hardt et al. (2009) and Aeberhardt & Pouget (2007), study the wage gap for
second-generation immigrants in France. The former uses a new econometric
method to conclude that one third of the wage gap between ‘French natives’
(both of whose parents were born in France) and ‘African natives’ (both of
whose parents were born in an African country) is not explained by diﬀer-
ences in observable covariates between the two groups. The second study
concludes that occupational segregation rather than wage discrimination can
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9be observed. In addition, Belzil & Poinas (2009) estimate a ﬂexible dynamic
model of education choices and early career employment outcomes. The
study focuses on people of African origin and shows that schooling attain-
ments explain mainly the diﬀerences in access to early career employment
stability for this population. The parental background diﬀerences explain
it to a lesser extent. The diﬀerences between French natives and second-
generation immigrants in the labor market are partly due to education.
Theoretically, Becker (1957) studied discrimination for the ﬁrst time from
an economic point of view and assumed that discrimination is due to the taste
of individuals (employer, worker, consumer) which leads to a higher cost of
minority-workers for the employers. This discrimination should disappear
with competition and time because it depends on proﬁts. A second wave of
theories comes from Phelps (1972), Arrow (1973), Akerlof (1985) and Aigner
& Cain (1977). They introduce the concept of statistical discrimination:
discrimination is rational in a context of imperfect information due to ig-
norance about the average quality of minority groups. The persistence of
discrimination is explained by self-realization by minorities. In both cases,
imperfect competition is necessary to perpetuate discrimination. Intuitively,
more competition, for instance in a particular sector of the economy, should
lead to less discrimination for minorities. Some empirical studies like Black
& Strahan (2001) and Hellerstein et al. (2002) point out a correlation in this
direction between competition and discrimination.
To improve this intuition, empirical work can be carried out on two sec-
tors with diﬀerent characteristics concerning competition. To this end, public
and private sectors can be used. The choice of these two sectors results from
the fact that most of the public sector is not competitive in its wages and
hiring practices. Moreover this sector does not maximize proﬁts. So there
is no competitive pressure in this sector. There is a rich literature on the
comparison between the private and public sectors. Empirical studies usually
use wage-decomposition à la Blinder-Oaxaca to identify a public sector pre-
mium. But there are many criticisms concerning the choice of independent
variables and the speciﬁcation of the model, which impact discrimination
measure. Recent literature estimates switching regression models in order to
correct for bias due to inclusion in a sector. Indeed it is highly probable that
selection between the two sectors is non-random due to diﬀerent character-
istics (for instance Dustman & Van Soest (1998) for Germany, Van Ophem
(1993) and Hartog & Oosterbeek (1993) for the Netherlands, Van der Gaag
& Vijverberg (1988) for Ivory Coast, Fougère & Pouget (2003b) for France
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9and Heitmueller (2006) for Scotland). The conclusions are very dependent
on national characteristics.
Only three papers deal with this subject in France: Fougère & Pouget
(2003b), Bargain & Melly (2008) and Beﬀy & Kamionka (2003). Fougère
& Pouget (2003b) aim to replicate the characteristics of the French public
sector in their model by a tree of choices and try to identify the main deter-
minants of entry into the public sector. Bargain & Melly (2008) use quantile
regressions on a panel data set to measure the wage gap. They ﬁnd that
after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, only small pay diﬀerences be-
tween sectors remain. Beﬀy & Kamionka (2003) use a job search model and
their estimation takes into account selectivity and sector choice biases. The
results show that a large public sector pay premium exists for women and for
low wages, whereas men of the public sector would earn more in the private
sector.
The papers in the recent literature, which focus on the comparison of
discrimination against minorities in the public and private sectors, essentially
concern gender issues. Ethnicity or race are the subjects of studies mainly in
the United Kingdom and the United States (see Gregory & Borland (1999)
p.3616). The public sector is renowned for more equity in wages and hiring,
notably concerning gender in the French case. The pay diﬀerences between
men and women are obviously lower in the public sector than in the private
one. Studying discrimination against another minority in the two sectors can
illuminate debates on the fairness of the public sector. The aim of this paper
is to compare discrimination against French people of foreign origin in the
public versus the private sector, to enhance the theoretical intuition about
discrimination.
This paper is organized as follows. The data are presented in Section 2
and the results of estimations in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the issues of
selection introduced in 3. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The data
The data are drawn from the French Labor Force Survey (Enquête Emploi
en Continu) collected by the French National Institute of Statistics, INSEE.
Each quarter, around 45,000 households are interviewed, which represents
roughly 70,000 individuals. All members of a household can be interviewed
and carry the same weight in the sample. Only 1/6 of the sample is new
4








































9each quarter and each household is interviewed six times in order to measure
quarterly changes. This survey contains information about education level,
occupation, wages, region, industry, employment status, social background
and sector of employment.
Individuals’ origin appears only in the most recent version through ques-
tions about parents’ nationality. This is why only the 2006 data are used
in this paper. Individuals are considered as second-generation immigrants
when they possess French nationality and at least one parent has another
nationality. Immigrants from Southern Europe and Africa constitute the
biggest minorities in France and their assimilation into the labor market is
very diﬀerent. Most studies on this subject compare them to ﬁnd out why
the African immigrants are less assimilated in France than the South Euro-
pean. Their children represent 76% of second-generation immigrants in this
sample. Thereafter an ‘African native’ represents a French national with at
least one parent with an African nationality at birth. The same vocabulary
is used for all origins. The distinction between an individual with one or two
foreign parents is important. The sample permits us to introduce a dummy
on the gender of the non-French parent in estimations. As we can see in the
descriptive statistics, individuals of African origin are more likely to have
two non-French parents while those of South European origin are as likely
to have one or both non-French parents. The regressions take into account
the gender of the non-French parent in order to observe if the nationality of
father or of the mother has more inﬂuence on their child’s later earnings.
The estimations are based on a sample composed of individuals aged
between 16 and 60, who are neither in education nor in retirement. The
survey contains workers in both the private and public sectors. The self-
employed workers are omitted because this article focuses on direct or indirect
discrimination by employers. Hourly wages are estimated in the following
section and are calculated using the weekly hours of a ‘normal’ week. These
wages are net of contributions but not of tax assessment. As the question
on wages is only asked in the ﬁrst and the last interview, the data hold only
one wage per person in the year 2006. However, this information is self-
reported and subject to measurement errors, especially for professions with
ﬂexible working hours such as managers. It would not be an issue for the
measurement of the wage gap between French natives and foreign natives as
the measurement error should be the same in the two groups.
After reducing the sample, it contains 26,190 individuals and around
11% are of foreign origin. Four main groups of origin can be distinguished.
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9Table 1. Descriptive statistics by origin and sector
French Foreigner
France N/E Europe S Europe Africa
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
# observations 6,111 16,018 161 381 296 958 210 724 96 1,092
Hourly wage (Euro) 12.81 10.76 12.85 11.29 11.96 10.60 10.74 9.68 10.10 10.07
(9.10) (7.55) (6.33) (4.98) (6.74) (6.33) (7.25) (5.79) (4.77) (12.65)
Foreign parent
Father - - 37.9 33.9 35.5 28.7 14.8 11.4 - -
Mother - - 39.7 36.0 19.9 14.5 9.5 5.9 - -
Both - - 22.4 30.1 44.6 56.8 75.7 82.7 100 100
Age
less than 25 5.95 12.52 1.18 6.31 4.22 8.99 9.95 14.54 3.77 5.97
25 to 45 52.53 54.81 35.88 40.40 49.35 56.67 61.91 61.91 50.00 56.75
45 to 65 41.52 32.67 62.94 53.28 46.43 34.34 28.14 23.55 46.23 37.28
Female 62.00 44.45 68.82 47.98 62.34 46.87 64.07 43.50 64.15 33.74
Education
Univ. 3rd degree 7.03 5.79 11.18 7.07 4.55 3.54 10.82 6.05 21.70 6.14
Univ. 2nd degree 14.63 4.52 14.71 4.29 12.01 4.04 11.26 5.15 12.26 6.40
Univ. 1st degree 16.62 14.70 12.35 12.88 17.21 12.83 10.82 12.23 3.77 5.28
High school 18.91 17.76 22.35 17.42 18.18 16.67 19.91 18.40 11.32 12.46
Vocational training 21.77 31.24 15.88 33.33 24.03 33.84 16.02 20.98 5.66 14.36
Secondary education 8.52 8.27 7.06 6.82 4.55 8.89 10.82 8.11 7.55 6.40
No graduation 12.51 17.72 16.47 18.18 19.48 20.20 20.35 39.09 37.74 48.96
Length of time in the job 189 129 213 166 182 128 104 78 93 100
# employees 12 9 12 9 14 9 15 14 21 16
Professional occupation
Manager 16.92 11.84 20.59 13.38 12.34 10.30 12.99 8.37 24.53 7.44
Intermediate 34.25 25.86 35.29 26.52 31.82 25.45 31.60 21.24 18.87 12.37
White-collar 41.12 29.28 39.41 28.79 47.08 32.63 49.78 34.62 49.06 28.46
Blue-collar 7.71 33.02 4.71 31.31 8.77 31.62 5.63 35.78 7.55 51.73
Type of contract
Rolling contract 87.93 90.83 89.41 95.45 86.69 92.22 74.89 84.94 52.83 89.19
Fixed term contract 9.23 5.44 8.24 3.54 9.74 5.05 18.61 11.33 35.85 9.08
Others 2.85 3.73 2.35 1.02 3.57 2.72 6.49 3.74 11.32 2.73
Work duration
Full time 81.05 84.23 81.18 86.11 82.47 83.33 77.49 84.04 64.15 82.96
Part time 18.95 15.77 18.82 13.89 17.53 16.67 22.51 15.96 35.85 17.04
Living area
Ile-de-France 12.84 11.47 15.88 15.15 15.91 15.86 31.17 31.40 35.85 40.31
Ile-de-France periphery 21.93 22.88 22.35 19.44 14.94 14.24 21.65 14.67 13.21 13.24
North 8.32 9.80 11.76 16.41 4.55 4.75 3.46 6.44 1.89 3.37
East 9.34 10.30 15.71 20.96 9.74 14.04 6.93 10.04 17.92 11.59
West 13.75 14.91 5.88 5.81 4.87 3.43 5.63 4.63 6.60 3.72
South East 12.09 10.78 5.88 4.55 13.31 13.64 5.19 6.69 6.60 8.56
Centre 9.45 10.73 8.24 8.08 13.31 17.17 13.85 11.58 10.38 8.56
South West 12.29 9.12 15.29 9.60 23.38 17.87 12.12 14.54 7.55 10.64
Built-up area (inhab.)
<20 000 37.83 43.97 29.41 33.33 32.47 32.32 12.99 14.29 22.64 20.16
20 000<200 000 27.15 23.55 32.94 26.77 26.62 27.07 29.44 24.32 19.81 21.45
>200 000 35.02 32.48 37.65 39.90 40.91 40.61 57.58 61.39 57.55 58.39
ZUS (Sensitive Urban Area) 5.49 4.73 6.47 7.32 5.52 5.96 20.78 24.71 22.64 19.29
Note: (1) Public sector (2) Private sector. All variables except log wage, age,
tenure, number of employees and number of children are percentages. French people of
another foreign origin are not represented in this table.
Source: Enquête Emploi en Continu survey, INSEE, Paris, 2006.
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9The ﬁrst one is French with North and East European parents mainly from
Poland, Russio and Rumania and represents 2.07% of the sample. The statis-
tics in Table 1 show that they are more educated and skilled than the French
average but also older. The second signiﬁcant group comes from Southern
Europe and accounts for 4.74% of the sample. This wave of immigration
mainly came in France en the 1930s and 1960s. The second-generation, now
French, is lower skilled than the French average and they are more likely to
work in the private sector. Then African natives have to be distinguished.
They come from the most recent wave of immigration to France and they
account for 3.68% of the sample. Their countries of origin are North Africa
and sub-Saharan Africa. Their parents arrived at the time of decolonization
or later from ex-colonies in North Africa. Two thirds of the descent of sub-
Saharan Africans came also from ex-colonies. For one third of them French
is their mother tongue. Africa is now the biggest source of immigrants in
France. This group is younger and has more children. More than 30% live
in Paris and its suburbs and another 30% in other big cities. They work
more in the private than in the public sector and they are likely to be ei-
ther more or less educated than the French average. This last phenomenon
can be linked with the auto-realization of discrimination in the labor market
by expectation. People know that intermediate qualiﬁcations for them are
less attractive than for other workers, due to discrimination. They under or
over-invest in education to escape from this diﬀerence of treatment. Finally, a
last group of French nationals of foreign descent (other countries) is created,
which represents about 0.59% of the whole sample. Including foreigners, who
do not have French nationality, allows a comparison with second-generation
immigrants. They represent 4.61% of the sample.
The public sector includes state, local government and public hospital
employees and it represents 26.35% of working people. The private sector
includes private ﬁrms, non-proﬁt associations publicly-owned and national
ﬁrms. National publicly-owned ﬁrms represent 24.41% of the private sector
and have been added because of their proﬁt maximization management. The
public sector is slightly over-represented as it represented only 21.3% of work-
ing people in France on December 31st, 2006. 49% of this population work
at state level, 32% for the local public sector and 19% in public hospitals.
The sample seems to be representative as the ﬁgures are 52.53%, 31.12% and
16.34% for each public subsector, respectively. A description of the French
public sector has been made by Pouget (2005). He points out diﬀerences
between the public and private sectors. As in this sample, he notes that the
7








































9skills structure varies across sectors. It hires more managers, intermediate
professionals and white-collar than blue-collar workers, who are employed
more by the private sector. Moreover, in the public sector, workers are of-
ten over-qualiﬁed compared to the level required. This is partly due to the
increase in unemployment in the eighties. Indeed civil servant have a job for
life in France and, as Krueger (1988), and Fougère & Pouget (2003b) in the
French case, have obseved the application rate for government jobs increases
as the ratio of public to private sector earnings increases or as unemployment
rate rises. Consequently the average quality of applicants in the public sec-
tor raises with the number of applicants. Indeed, public sector employment
seems to attract more women because of its stability but they are often em-
ployed in low level or in part time jobs: the public sector is predominantly
female apart from manager functions. Moreover, the data show that work-
ers in the public sector are older than those in the private sector. Several
explanations could be given: ﬁrst, government budget constraint currently
lead the state to hire fewer civil servants to reduce the number of workers in
the public sector. As the state oﬀers life-time employment and then keeps
workers whatever their age, the number of older workers is higher. Secondly,
as workers are better qualiﬁed in the public sector they arrive later onto the
labor market.
Concerning the diversity of the national origin of workers, the South Eu-
ropean or African natives are under-represented in the public sector. This
fact has been emphasized by Pouget (2005). He distinguishes workers with
one foreign parent from those with two foreign parents. The latter are more
under-represented in the public sector and this is intensiﬁed for North African
natives. There is a tendency for immigrants’ children to have a lower prob-
ability of ﬁnding a job in the public sector than French natives, even when
they are the same age, have the same qualiﬁcations and an equivalent father’s
profession. These points are addressed in the following sections.
3 The results
Empirical evidence of diﬀerences in treatment toward workers because of
non-productive characteristics, such as physical criteria for instance, are es-
tablished through several methods. The more usual is to evaluate the wage
gap between the population which can be discriminated against and the wit-
ness population. Here the witness population is the French natives and the
8








































9potentially discriminated-against population is made up of the other natives.
As all individuals are not spread identically between both sectors, an estima-
tion of the probability of working in each sector is necessary to correct the
bias induced. Firstly, the wage gap is evaluated at diﬀerent levels of detail,
and secondly, attention is focused on selection issues.
3.1 Wage gap
In order to measure the wage gap due to individuals’ origin, a wage-equation
is estimated. The explanatory variables comprise a dummy controlling for
origin and all variables are interacted with a sector dummy in order to identify
a diﬀerential due to origin in both sectors. Thereby, it is possible to take
into account separately the eﬀects of origin in each sector and to compare




iβ + pub.origβpo + ui (1)
where X is the vector of characteristics, u an error term and i is an
individual index.
To complete the study, the sectors are divided into subsectors in a sec-
ond estimation. Then both origin and sector dummies are interacted with
all explanatory variables in a third regression to analyse variables subject to
diﬀerence by origin. In each estimation, independent variables control for
post attributes such as qualiﬁcations, working time (full-time versus part-
time), employment contracts and economic sector (industry, trade, ﬁnance
etc). Concerning individual characteristics, age (quadratic function), educa-
tion, gender and housing location (region, size of the city, sensitive urban
area (ZUS)) are added in the regression. A variable concerning which par-
ent does not have the French nationality is then used. The results of these
estimations are shown in Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10 in the Appendix. Tables 2, 3
and 4 sum up the main ﬁndings concerning the impact of origins and sectors
ceteris paribus. The reference group is the French natives working in the
public sector.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the estimation of log wage-equation
when a dummy controlling for the sector (public or private) is interacted
with all the variables of the equation. The ﬁrst estimation, noted A in the
9








































9Table 2. Public and private sector log wage-equation
A B
Public Private Public Private
sector sector sector sector
# of observations 6,906 19,284 6,906 19,284
Intercept 2.08*** 1.97*** 2.08*** 1.97***
Origin
French - - - -
N./E. Europe -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10
S. Europe -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.11
Africa -0.05** -0.04*** -0.08 -0.14*





Adjusted R2 0.5255 0.5256
Note: * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%. This
estimation is controlled for qualiﬁcations, working time, employment contracts, economic
sector, age, education, gender and housing location.
Source: INSEE, Paris.
table, does not contain explanatory variables on workers’ foreign parents. A
diﬀerence of 0.11 is observable between wages in favor of the public sector.
This result is not signiﬁcant and conforms to the literature on France, which
has no uniform results on a premium in favor of one sector. Looking for
the origin of workers, all the European natives have no signiﬁcant gap com-
pared to the French natives. On the other hand, the African natives earn
5% less than the French natives in the public sector and 4% in the private
sector. The diﬀerence between the two sectors is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. In the private sector, the pay-diﬀerence is almost the same as for
the foreigners. In the public sector, the wage gap for the foreigners is 8%,
three percentage points more than the one with the African natives. The
presence of a pay-diﬀerence in the public sector seems astonishing because of
wage scales. But the coeﬃcient takes into account all the variables of the re-
gressions. It means that between a foreign native with all the same controlled
characteristics than as a French native, a diﬀerence of x% is observable on
average. For instance, the fact that African natives are on average over edu-
10








































9cated for their occupation contributes to this diﬀerential. When a dummy on
the non-French parents is added in the regression, column B, there is an im-
pact only on the coeﬃcients of origin and the signiﬁcance of some coeﬃcients
disappears. The foreign parents do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages and
origin seems to be more important to explain wage diﬀerentials. However,
lower ﬁgures for the coeﬃcients of origin compensate for the positive eﬀect of
foreign parents. To conclude, these two variables do not change the general
pattern of results, and neither of the coeﬃcients on origin is signiﬁcant.
Table 3. Subsectors log wage-equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of observations 3,649 2,133 1,124 4,747 14,537
Intercept 2.02*** 1.84*** 1.63*** 1.89*** 1.98***
Origin
French - - - - -
N./E. Europe -0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.00
S. Europe -0.04* 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.00
Africa -0.10*** -0.04 0.06 -0.04 -0.04***
Foreigner -0.08* -0.11** -0.04 -0.07*** -0.04***
Adjusted R2 0.5338
Note: (1) state, (2) local government, (3) public hospital, (4) public and national ﬁrm, (5)
private ﬁrm. * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%. This
estimation is controlled for qualiﬁcations, working time, employment contracts, economic
sector, age, education, gender and housing location.
Source: INSEE, Paris.
Then sectors are detailed in Table 3. The public sector is divided into
three parts (state, local government and public hospital) and the private sec-
tor into two parts (publicly-owned national ﬁrms and private ﬁrms). The
wage gaps between subsectors are not signiﬁcant except for the public hos-
pital. A diﬀerence of 0.38 can be observed. As in the previous estimations,
only the African natives have a signiﬁcant pay-diﬀerential from the French
natives. This wage gap varies with the subsector. The African natives work-
ing for the state are paid 10% less, and only 4% less in public national ﬁrms
than in private ﬁrms. There is no signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the other subsec-
tors. In comparison, foreigners have a wage gap of 8% at state level, 6% in
national public ﬁrms and 4% in private ﬁrms. The private ﬁrms treat the
11








































9foreigners and the African natives in the same way, whereas the public and
national ﬁrms have a pay-diﬀerence only for the foreigners. The larger wage
gap is observable at the state level for the African natives. The results are not
signiﬁcant in the public hospital because of the low number of observations in
this subsector. The wage gap is no longer signiﬁcant at the state level and in
public and private ﬁrms when the variables on ‘having a non-French mother’
and ‘having a non-French father’ are introduced (see column B, Table 3).
The interpretation is unchanged with regard to the previous estimation and
the results are not shown.
In order to observe a particular eﬀect of origin on the other variables, a
third equation is estimated. This equation interacts the dummies of origin
and sector with all other explanatory variables. Table 4 sums up the results.
The coeﬃcients of individual characteristics may depend on origin in that
certain institutions may tend to equalize wages between the origins and thus
act to oﬀset the discriminatory impact of the intercept term. In this case,
a diﬀerence between intercept terms is observable for the South European
and African natives in both sectors. The South European natives have a gap
of 0.11 in the public sector and 0.12 in the private sector compared to the
French natives in the same sector. Concerning the African natives, the gap is
positive and reaches 0.21 in the public sector and 0.22 in the private sector.
The intercept of the African natives could be amazing but this phenomenon
has explanations. The constant does not represent a basic salary in our case.
The individual characteristics do not explain the wages of African natives
as well as those of the French natives. This leads to a higher intercept
term. Moreover, roughly 30% of African natives earns the minimum wage
compared to 14% of the French natives. The minimum wage form a mass
point at the beginning of the wage distribution and it decreases the ﬁt of the
wage-decomposition by individual characteristics.
The variables of Table 4 give interesting information on the impact of
individual characteristics of diﬀerent groups. A gender gap is observable in
both sectors but it is 4% higher in the private sector. This result conforms the
studies gender diﬀerences between the two sectors. The gender gap increases
signiﬁcantly only in the case of the Southern European natives and is lower
for the foreigners. In general, men and women of the same origin have the
same gender gap as the French natives: the origin gap is not aﬀected by
gender. The coeﬃcient of age is higher for the South European and African
natives. It could be explain by the statistical discrimination against workers
12








































9Table 4. Public and private sector log wage-equation by origin
Public sector Private sector
(F) (NEE) (SE) (A) (For) (F) (NEE) (SE) (A) (For)
# of observations 6,111 161 296 210 96 16,018 381 958 724 1,092
Intercept 2.08*** 2.05*** 1.97*** 2.29*** 2.21*** 1.98*** 1.90*** 1.84*** 2.20*** 2.10***
Age 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01*
Age squared*100 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.01**
Female -0.08*** -0.07* -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.03** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.06***
Education
PhD 0.19*** 0.29*** 0.05 0.25*** 0.07 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.04 0.24*** 0.07
Master’s degree 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.08 -0.05 0.07 0.05
Bachelor 0.07*** 0.12** 0.05 0.07* 0.14*** 0.06*** 0.10* 0.04 0.05 0.12***
Graduate - - - - - - - - - -
Voc. Trainee -0.07*** -0.08* -0.11*** 0.00 0.02 -0.06*** -0.07 -0.10*** 0.01 0.02
Secondary educ. -0.08*** -0.06 -0.09** -0.09** -0.06 -0.04*** -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03
No graduation -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.21*** -0.10*** -0.06* -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.04
Fixed term -0.13*** -0.13* -0.04 -0.16*** -0.08** -0.08*** -0.07 0.01 -0.10*** -0.03
ZUS -0.04** -0.03 -0.03 -0.06* -0.04 -0.04*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.06** -0.05**
Adjusted R2 0.5315
Note: (F) French natives, (NEE) Northern and Eastern European natives, (SE) Southern European natives, (A) African
natives, (For) foreigner. * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%. Natives with other origins are
dropped in this table. This estimation is controlled for qualiﬁcations, working time, employment contracts, economic sector,












































9of these origins. The return on education is diﬀerent depending on origin but
relatively similar in both sectors. The East and North European natives have
almost the same return on education, except an increase of 10% when they
are PhD graduates. The South European natives have lower returns on a low
level of education and no signiﬁcant returns on a high level. It is important to
note that they are less highly educated than the French average. The African
natives show a diﬀerent trend. In the public sector their returns on education
are as high as those of the French natives, except in extreme levels with a
higher return on a PhD and a lower return in the case of no graduation. In the
private sector, the extreme levels show the same results but all coeﬃcients of
the middle levels are not signiﬁcant. The lower coeﬃcient of ‘no graduation’
is aﬀected by the minimum wage as described above: no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
are observed between levels around ‘graduate’. The returns on education for
the African natives are more homogeneous than those of French natives, and
they have to obtain a high diploma to beneﬁt from a signiﬁcant return.
Two other variables are added in Table 4: the type of contract and the
housing localization in a urban sensitive area (ZUS). Firstly, there is the
impact of having a ﬁxed term contract. The African natives have this kind
of contract more than the average. And the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly less
high than for the French natives, whereas it is not signiﬁcant for the other
origins. Secondly, the dummy on the ZUS decreases the wages of the African
natives more, whatever the sector. This impact is added to the discrimination
factor as Simon et al. (2000) show in their note. Indeed, the immigrants from
Africa tend to live more in social housing and not in private apartments and
the ZUS are essentially made up of social housing and located in the suburbs.
The origin of workers has a strong impact for the African natives. Com-
pared to the French natives, they earn around 5% less in the private and in
the public sectors. Unfortunately, the sample seems to small to have a real
and signiﬁcant eﬀect the number and the sex of non-French parent. Detailing
the sectors, the state has the biggest wage gap, 6% more than in the private
ﬁrms. The South European natives do not have a signiﬁcant wage gap with
the French natives. An estimation by origin show that the coeﬃcients of
individual characteristics are diﬀerent. The North and East European na-
tives are relatively similar to the French natives. The wage of the South
European natives is lower for the women and their return of education are
not signiﬁcant for the highest levels of education. The returns of education
are higher for the PhD level for the African natives but in the private sector,
no signiﬁcant return is observable for the intermediate levels of education.
14








































9The negative impact of the type of contract and the ZUS for them show that
the wage is sensitive to other forms of discrimination. The hiring process is
known as discriminating against the second-generation African immigrants
as it is explained in the introduction. And the diﬃculties of this minority on
the housing market decrease their wages as the variable ‘ZUS’ show.
3.2 Selection issues: the probability of working in a sec-
tor
Economic discrimination can be present upstream from earnings and partic-
ularly in the hiring process. The workers have to choose between the public
and private sectors. The hiring process is diﬀerent and French natives and
non-French natives can be treated diﬀerently in the two sectors. The fol-
lowing section is concerned with describing this bias and simply evaluating
it. As can be observed, individuals apply in diﬀerent ways if they want to
work in the private or in the public sector. In the ﬁrst case, there is free
entry, with matching between employers and applicants. In the second case,
a majority is hired by examination results and the remainder through the
market. Consequently we cannot consider that the assignment between the
two sectors is random. A selection bias exists in the choice of the sector. A





iδ + origδo + νi (2)
where S∗ is latent variable, B the vector of characteristics, δ the coeﬃcient
to be estimated and ν the error term for participation.
The latent variable is not observable and an index-function is used:
Si = 1 if S
∗
i > 0
Si = 0 if S
∗
i ≤ 0
where Si = 1 and Si = 0 indicate private sector employment and pub-
lic sector employment respectively. The error term of the sector selection
equation is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σν.
The explanatory variables are all individual characteristics used in the
wage estimation. The individual’s social background completes the expla-
nation of the probability of working in the private or in the public sector.
15








































9Social background characteristics are supposed to aﬀect only the sector se-
lection and not wages. In the literature several variables are used e.g. the
education attainment of the parents, the father’s socio-professional group,
the mother’s working status or the siblings (see Hartog & Oosterbeek (1993),
Dustman & Van Soest (1998)). In this study, the mother’s and the father’s
socio-professional group are available. The last characteristic is highlighted
by Fougère & Pouget (2003a) in their study of the economic determinants
of the probability of working in the public sector. The type of occupation of
the father inﬂuences this probability. Particularly, the children of civil ser-
vants are over-represented in the public sector. Indeed, Pouget (2005) shows
that the children of civil servants are studying longer than the average and
the workers hired by the public sector are more qualiﬁed than those of the
private sector. Moreover, their knowledge of the functioning of the public
sector gives them the opportunity to prepare the exams better. This last
piece of information is important and suggests it could be use to identify sec-
tor employment, as do diﬀerent papers about the French case. This variable
is added into the probit and it is compressed into six categories. Farmers,
craftsmen, storekeepers, the self-employed and entrepreneurs are the ﬁrst
category, called independent. High level occupations are the professions, col-
lege and university teachers and executives. Middle level occupations are
made up of intermediary employees. Low level occupations are split in two
categories: skilled and non-skilled workers. The last category is non-working
people. Moreover, a variable concerning the individual’s expected wage gain
from public employment is relevant to the probability of working in the pri-
vate or in the public sector and is added in a second regression. This variable
is the diﬀerential between the expected wages in the public sector and the
expected wages in the private sector, calculated in the ﬁrst estimation of
Section 3.1 with the observable characteristics of each worker. As in the
estimation of the wage gap, the variables ‘having a non-French mother’ and
‘having a non-French father’ are then added to the regression. The results
are summarized in Table 5.
In estimation A, the South European and African natives have a proba-
bility of working in the private sector, which is 3% higher than the French
natives. The North and East European natives are similar to the French
natives. The foreigners have an 18% higher chance of working in the pri-
vate sector than the French natives. This can be explained by the fact that
foreigners are not allowed to be civil servants, who represent a large propor-
tion of public sector employment. Concerning the parents’ socio-professional
16








































9Table 5. Probability to work in the private sector
A B C
# of observations 26,190 26,190 26,190
Origin
French - - -
N./E. Europe 0.01 -0.02 0.09
S. Europe 0.03** 0.03** 0.11
Africa 0.03* -0.01 0.06
Foreigner 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.16
Father’s occupation
Independent 0.02* 0.01 0.01
Executive, profession, professor 0.02* 0.01 0.01
Intermediate profession - - -
White-collar -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Blue-collar 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Non-working 0.02 0.02 0.02
Mother’s occupation
Independent 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Executive, profession, professor 0.01 0.01 0.01
Intermediate profession - - -
White-collar 0.03** 0.02** 0.02**
Blue-collar 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Non-working 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***





Pseudo R2 0.0793 0.1340 0.1346
Note: * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%. This
estimation is controlled for qualiﬁcations, working time, employment contracts, economic
sector, age, education, gender and housing location.
Source: INSEE, Paris.
category, the reference is the intermediate professions. Having a blue-collar
father leads to a signiﬁcant 3% higher probability of working in the private
sector and an independent or high level occupation father increases this prob-
ability by 2%. Having an executive, profession or professor mother have the
same impact that a mother who has an intermediate profession. The other
socio-professional categories emphasize the probability to work in the private
sector. The non-exclusion of the socio-professional categories of both parents
17








































9from the probit is tested with a likelihood ratio statistic. This test shows
that the null hypothesis is rejected at 99%.
Estimation B takes into account the individual’s expected wage gain from
public employment. It assumes that individuals behave a rationally by com-
paring the potential wage in both sectors before deciding to work in a par-
ticular sector. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly negative. This implies that the
greater the predicted wage gain from working in the public instead of the pri-
vate sector, the less likely an individual is to select the private sector. This
result shows that the matching seems to be ﬁtted to individuals’ observable
productive characteristics: an increase of one point of the log wage diﬀer-
ential diminishes by 119% the probability of working in the private sector.
The largeness of the coeﬃcient is due to the fact that the log wage is very
small, between 0 and 6. It leans on the non-random assignation between
the sectors. The coeﬃcient of the African natives is no longer signiﬁcant. It
means that their observable productive characteristics are more adapted to
the private sector than to the public sector. The likelihood ratio statistic of
the expected wage gain from public employment rejects the null hypothesis
at 99%.
Then estimation C includes variables on the parents’ nationality. The
only change concerns the origin of workers. The coeﬃcients are no longer
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and, as in the wage estimation, the signif-
icance of the origin dummies disappears. This coeﬃcient means that the
non-French parent’s gender has not really an eﬀect on the probability of
working in the private sector. The impact seems to be heterogeneous from
origin to origin. This can explain the lack of signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients. The
likelihood ratio statistic does not accept the null hypothesis at 90% and this
variable will not be used in the switching regression.
To conclude, only the South European natives have a higher probability
of working in the private sector, but they have no signiﬁcant wage gap with
the French natives. On the other hand, the African natives have the same
probability of working in both sectors, but a wage gap exists with the French
natives. This gap is particularly large at the state level.
18









































The selection bias induced by the choice between the private and the pub-
lic sector can be introduced into the equation-wage. It takes into account
the non-random assignment to a sector and the simultaneity of the wage
equations and sector selection function. A model of endogenous switching
regression is adapted to this case. This model was described by Lee (1978)
and was applied to the sector choice by Hartog & Oosterbeek (1993). Indi-
viduals are sorted over diﬀerent states by a switching equation. In our case,
they work in the public or in the private sector. The observed wage rate
depends on the worker’s status, i.e. we observe:
ln(w1i) = X
′
iβ1 + origβ1o + u1i, (3)
ln(w2i) = X
′
iβ2 + origβ2o + u2i, (4)
S
∗
i = γ(ln(w1i) − ln(w2i)) + B
′
iδ + origδo + νi. (5)
where S, wji, Xi, Bi, βj and δi are already deﬁned in previous parts, j = 1
if the individual i works in the public sector and j = 2 if she/he works in the
private sector. Thus we have a simultaneous equations model involving qual-
itative limited dependent variables. Equation (6) is the switching function
and takes up the sector choice equation, and equations (3) and (4) are the
sector speciﬁc wage equations deﬁned in the previous part. The variables
permitting to identify the switching coeﬃcients are the socio-professional
category of the mother and the father.
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the switching model. The ﬁrst
two columns show the coeﬃcients for the wage equations and the third col-
umn contains the estimates for the switching equation. This regression con-
ﬁrms a diﬀerence between the African natives and the rest of the French
population. In the private sector, their wage gap is as large as that of the
foreigners. In the public sector, their wage gap is 2% larger than in the pri-
vate sector but is far from that of the foreigners with a 7% diﬀerence. The
South European natives have no diﬀerences from the French natives, but a
larger probability of working in the private sector. Concerning the impact
of the family background on the probability of working in a sector, only a
mother working as an independent signiﬁcantly increases the probability of
working in the private sector. All other coeﬃcients are no more signiﬁcant
than in the previous estimation of the choice of sector. This result is similar
to that of Hartog & Oosterbeek (1993).
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# of observations 6,906 19,284 26,190
Intercept 1.94*** 1.58*** 0.34*
Origin
French - - -
N./E. Europe -0.01 -0.01 -0.06
S. Europe -0.01 -0.02 0.10*
Africa -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.02
Foreigner -0.13*** -0.04*** 0.45***
Father’s occupation
Independent -0.01
















Note: * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%. This
estimation is controlled for qualiﬁcations, working time, employment contracts, economic
sector, age, education, gender and housing location.
Source: INSEE, Paris.
The correlations between the wages and the sector choice equation are the
coeﬃcients ρi in the switching model. Since ρ1 is positive and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, the workers in the private sector earn lower wages in that
sector than a random individual from the sample would have earned. On the
contrary, ρ2 is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, those working
in the public sector earn higher wages in that sector than a random individ-
20








































9ual from the sample would earn. An interpretation is that the workers in
the public sector have better observable characteristics concerning the wage-
decomposition than the rest of the sample. But many of their characteristics
would be attractive in the private sector too.
5 Conclusion
Using the French Labor Force Survey, this paper provides an empirical eval-
uation of the discrimination against second-generation immigrants. In order
to compare the public and the private sector, a wage-equation is estimated
by sector. But the assignment between sectors is non-random. A switching
model takes this bias into account by a simultaneous equations model with
limited dependent and qualitative endogenous variables.
It is found that only the African natives have a signiﬁcant pay-diﬀerential
from the French natives. The particular situation of the African natives is
pointed out in all studies on the second-generation immigrants in France,
and compared to the South European natives, who are better assimilated in
the labor market. Several explanations can be given. The ﬁrst is that the ed-
ucational attainment is really diﬀerent, as Belzil & Poinas (2009) show. This
aﬀects the hiring process and their wages into the labor market. The second
explanation is the diﬀerences of behavior at work observed in the diﬀerent
minorities in France, which is put forward by Senik & Verdier (2007). A
third interpretation is the importance of housing. The fact that the African
immigrants are mostly in social housing and in ZUS decreases their prob-
ability of access to higher-level posts. This study shows that this has an
impact on wages too. Thus, diﬀerences in behavior, unobserved factors or
discrimination can explain the wage gap of the African natives.
The other result of this paper is that, contrary to the reputation of fairness
enjoyed by the public sector, the African natives are as discriminated against
in this sector as they are in the private sector. The wage gap is observed
in the simple OLS wage-equation estimation and persists when we control
for the non-random assignment of individuals in the sectors. Looking at the
sectors in detail, the pay-diﬀerential is larger at the state level, despite the
presence of wage scales.
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9Table 7. Public and private sector log wage-equation
A B
Public Private Public Private
Intercept 2.08*** 1.97*** 2.08*** 1.97***
N./E. Europe -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10
S. Europe -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.11
Africa -0.05** -0.04*** -0.08 -0.14*
Others -0.05 -0.06* -0.08 -0.15*
Foreigner -0.08** -0.05*** -0.10 -0.15*
Age 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02***
Age squared*100 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02***
Female -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.11***
Phd 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18***
Master’s degree 0.15*** 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.06***
Bachelor 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06***
Voc. Trainee -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06***
Secondary educ. -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.08*** -0.04***
No graduation -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.14**
Tenure 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.05***
# employees -0.04** -0.01 -0.04** -0.01
Profession 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.30***
Art and literacy 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.20***
Executive 0.16*** 0.24*** 0.16*** 0.24***
Engineer 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.20***
Clergy -0.21 -0.34** -0.21 -0.34**
Tertiary intermediate profession -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.08***
Technician -0.15*** -0.08*** -0.15*** -0.08***
White-collar -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24***
Qualiﬁed worker -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.28*** -0.25***
Non-qualiﬁed worker -0.28*** -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.31***
Fixed term -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.08***
Trainee -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.16***
Apprentice -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.53*** -0.54***
Part time 0.00 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.02***
Grande couronne -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.09***
North -0.05*** -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.11***
East -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06***
West -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.11***
South east -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.10***
Center -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.04** -0.09***
South west -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.09***
<20000 inhab 0.00 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.02***
>200000 inhab 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zus -0.04** -0.04*** -0.04** -0.04***
Industry -0.06 0.07*** -0.06 0.07***
Electricity, gas, watter -0.14 0.13*** -0.14 0.13***
Construction -0.38 0.07*** -0.39 0.07***
Trade, restauration -0.30** -0.02 -0.30** -0.02
Communication, transportation -0.23** 0.05*** -0.23** 0.05***
Finance, insurance, property, ﬁrms’ service -0.24** 0.06*** -0.25** 0.06***
Community, social and particular service -0.20* 0.00 -0.20* 0.00
Non-French mother 0.01 0.09
Non-French father 0.09 0.09
Both 0.02 0.10
Adjusted R2 0.5255 0.5256
Note: * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%.
Source: INSEE, Paris. 25








































9Table 8. Subsectors log wage-equation
A
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept 2.02*** 1.84*** 1.63*** 1.89*** 1.98***
N./E. Europe -0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.00
S. Europe -0.04* 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.00
Africa -0.10*** -0.04 0.06 -0.04 -0.04***
Others -0.07 0.03 -0.14 -0.10* -0.04
Foreigner -0.08* -0.11** -0.04 -0.07*** -0.04***
Age 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02***
Age squared*100 -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02***
Female -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.01 -0.10*** -0.12***
PhD 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.69*** 0.15*** 0.19***
Master’s degree 0.13*** 0.09*** -0.06 0.07*** 0.06***
Bachelor 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.06***
Voc. Trainee -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.03 -0.05*** -0.06***
Secondary educ. -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.07 -0.05*** -0.04***
No graduation -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.14***
Tenure*100 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.05***
# employees*100 -0.03 -0.07*** 0.03 0.01 -0.01
Profession 0.32*** 0.13** -0.33*** 0.28*** 0.32***
Art and literacy 0.00 0.26*** 0.00 0.10 0.22***
Executive 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.09 0.23*** 0.26***
Engineer 0.16*** 0.27** 0.36** 0.25*** 0.20***
Clergy -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.34**
Service intermediate profession -0.13*** -0.16** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06***
Technician -0.20*** -0.10*** -0.04 -0.06*** -0.07***
White-collar -0.27*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.23***
Qualiﬁed worker -0.31*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.24***
Non-qualiﬁed worker -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.23 -0.32*** -0.29***
Fixed term -0.19*** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.07***
Trainee -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.12 -0.15*** -0.17***
Apprentice -0.66*** -0.41*** -0.84** -0.48*** -0.56***
Part time 0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03***
Grande couronne -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.03 -0.11*** -0.09***
North -0.05** -0.04 -0.01 0.06*** -0.12***
East -0.04* -0.06** 0.00 -0.04 -0.06***
West -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.10***
South east -0.05** -0.06** -0.04 -0.05*** -0.11***
Center -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.03*** -0.09***
South west -0.06*** -0.02 0.01 0.07*** -0.08***
<20000 inhab 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02* -0.02***
>200000 inhab 0.00 0.03 -0.05** 0.00 0.00
Zus -0.01 -0.09*** -0.04 -0.04** -0.04***
Industry 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***
Electricity, gas, water 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
Construction 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Trade, restauration -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Communication, transportation 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
Finance, insurance, property, ﬁrms’ service 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Community, social and particular service 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.5338
Note: (1) state, (2) local government, (3) public hospital, (4) public and national ﬁrm, (5)
private ﬁrm. * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%.
Source: INSEE, Paris.
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9Table 9. Public and private sector log wage-equation by origin
Private
Fr NE Eur S Eur Afr Foreigner
Intercept 2.08*** 2.05*** 1.97*** 2.29*** 2.21***
Age 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02***
Age squared*100 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.02***
Female -0.08*** -0.07* -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.03**
PhD 0.19*** 0.29*** 0.05 0.25*** 0.07
Master’s degree 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.15*** 0.14***
Bachelor 0.07*** 0.12** 0.05 0.07* 0.14***
Voc. Trainee -0.07*** -0.08* -0.11*** 0.00 0.02
Secondary educ. -0.08*** -0.06 -0.09** -0.09** -0.06
No graduation -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.21*** -0.10*** -0.06*
Tenure*100 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10***
# employees*100 -0.04** -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.05
Profession 0.31*** 0.16** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.17**
Art and literacy 0.12*** 0.15 0.92*** 0.49** 0.56***
Executive 0.16*** 0.07 0.14** 0.16** 0.38***
Engineer 0.22*** 0.21** 0.24*** 0.12 0.39***
Clergy -0.20 -0.20 -0.09 -0.20 -0.81
Tertiary intermediate profession -0.12*** -0.11* -0.12** -0.17*** -0.07
Technician -0.15*** -0.14 -0.18*** -0.27*** -0.16**
White-collar -0.24*** -0.31*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.34***
Qualiﬁed worker -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.32***
Non-qualiﬁed worker -0.28*** -0.25*** -0.30*** -0.36*** -0.33***
Fixed term -0.13*** -0.13* -0.04 -0.16*** -0.08**
Trainee -0.14*** -0.09 -0.21*** -0.13** -0.13*
Apprentice -0.53*** -0.48* -0.26* -0.23 -0.74***
Part time 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.03
Grande couronne -0.06*** -0.07 -0.09** -0.09** -0.02
North -0.05*** -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 0.10**
East -0.05*** -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.10***
West -0.09*** -0.12* -0.10* -0.10* -0.06
South east -0.05*** 0.09 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.03
Center -0.04*** 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.03
South west -0.04*** -0.02 -0.06* -0.06 0.02
<20000 inhab 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.01
>200000 inhab 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06** -0.04
Zus -0.04** -0.03 -0.03 -0.06* -0.04
Industry -0.06 -0.27 -0.10 -0.44** -0.09
Electricity, gas, watter -0.05 -0.16 -0.10 -0.51** -0.09
Construction -0.05 -0.30 -0.07 -0.46 0.04
Trade, restauration -0.09** -0.18 -0.19 -0.55*** -0.04
Communication, transportation -0.05* -0.22 -0.15 -0.53*** -0.04
Finance, insurance, property, ﬁrms’ service -0.04* -0.15 -0.08 -0.55*** -0.08
Community, social and particular service -0.04 -0.16 -0.13 -0.51*** 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.5315
Note: * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%.
Source: INSEE, Paris.
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9Table 10. Public and private sector log wage-equation by origin (continua-
tion)
Private
Fr NE Eur S Eur Afr Foreigner
Intercept 1.98*** 1.90*** 1.84*** 2.20*** 2.10***
Age 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01*
Age squared*100 -0.02*** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.01**
Female -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.06***
PhD 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.04 0.24*** 0.07
Master’s degree 0.07*** 0.08 -0.05 0.07 0.05
Bachelor 0.06*** 0.10* 0.04 0.05 0.12***
Voc. Trainee -0.06*** -0.07 -0.10*** 0.01 0.02
Secondary educ. -0.04*** -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03
No graduation -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.04
Tenure*100 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.05***
# employees*100 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.02
Profession 0.31*** 0.16* 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.16*
Art and literacy 0.15*** 0.18 0.95*** 0.52** 0.59***
Executive 0.23*** 0.14* 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.44***
Engineer 0.19*** 0.18** 0.21*** 0.09 0.36***
Clergy -0.26 -0.26 -0.15 -0.26 -0.87***
Tertiary intermediate profession -0.08*** -0.07 -0.08* -0.13** -0.03
Technician -0.07*** -0.06 -0.11** -0.19*** -0.09
White-collar -0.23*** -0.31*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.34***
Qualiﬁed worker -0.24*** -0.20*** -0.25*** -0.31*** -0.27***
Non-qualiﬁed worker -0.30*** -0.27*** -0.32*** -0.38*** -0.36***
Fixed term -0.08*** -0.07 0.01 -0.10*** -0.03
Trainee -0.16*** -0.11 -0.23*** -0.15** -0.15**
Apprentice -0.55*** -0.50** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.76***
Part time -0.01* -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.05
Grande couronne -0.10*** -0.11** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.05*
North -0.12*** -0.11** -0.14*** -0.18*** 0.03
East -0.07*** -0.04 -0.08** -0.09** 0.08**
West -0.12*** -0.15** -0.12** -0.13** -0.08
South east -0.11*** 0.04 -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.09**
Center -0.10*** -0.02 -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.03
South west -0.10*** -0.07 -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.03
<20000 inhab -0.02** -0.06 -0.02 -0.07** -0.03
>200000 inhab 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06** -0.04
Zus -0.04*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.06** -0.05**
Industry 0.05*** -0.15 0.02 -0.33* 0.03
Electricity, gas, watter 0.22*** 0.11 0.17 -0.24 0.17
Construction 0.36*** 0.12 0.35** -0.05 0.46***
Trade, restauration 0.18*** 0.09 0.08 -0.28* 0.23***
Communication, transportation 0.22*** 0.05 0.12 -0.26* 0.23***
Finance, insurance, property, ﬁrms’ service 0.24*** 0.13 0.21 -0.27* 0.20***
Community, social and particular service 0.14*** 0.03 0.06 -0.32** 0.19
Adjusted R2 0.5315
Note: * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%.
Source: INSEE, Paris.
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9Table 11. Probability to work in the private sector
A B C
Origin
N./E. Europe 0.01 -0.02 0.09
S. Europe 0.03** 0.03** 0.11
Africa 0.03* -0.01 0.06
Others 0.06 0.05 0.12
Foreigner 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.16
Age -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01***
Age squared*100 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
Female -0.11*** -0.06*** -0.06***
Education
PhD -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03**
Master’s degree -0.22*** -0.09*** -0.09***
Bachelor 0.00 0.02** 0.02**
Voc. Trainee 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Secondary educ. 0.03*** -0.01 -0.01
No graduation 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08***
Living area
Grande couronne -0.01 0.04*** 0.04***
North 0.01 0.09*** * 0.09***
East 0.01 0.05*** 0.05***
West 0.00 0.04*** 0.04***
South east -0.02** 0.04*** 0.04***
Center 0.02** 0.08*** 0.08***
South west -0.05*** 0.00 0.00
City size
<20000 inhab 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.07***
>200000 inhab 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03***
ZUS -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
Father’s occupation
Independent 0.02* 0.01 0.01
Executive, profession, professor 0.02* 0.01* 0.01*
White-collar -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Blue-collar 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Non-working 0.02 0.02 0.02
Mother’s occupation
Independent 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Executive, profession, professor 0.01 0.01 0.01
White-collar 0.03** 0.02** 0.02**
Blue-collar 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Non-working 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***





Pseudo R2 0.0793 0.1340 0.1346
Note: * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%.
Source: INSEE, Paris.
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9Table 12. Public and private sector wage-equations and sector selection
function
Public Private Selec. func.
Intercept 1.58*** 1.94*** 0.34*
N./E. Europe -0.01 -0.01 -0.06
S. Europe -0.02 -0.01 0.10*
Africa -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.02
Others -0.07 -0.05 0.11
Foreigner -0.13*** -0.04*** 0.45***
Age 0.04*** 0.02*** -0.05***
Age squared*100 -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.07***
Female -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.27***
PhD 0.21*** 0.18*** -0.02
Master’s degree 0.19*** 0.06*** -0.29***
Bachelor 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.10
Voc. Trainee -0.09*** -0.06*** 0.13***
Secondary educ. -0.08*** -0.04*** 0.07
No graduation -0.17*** -0.14*** 0.13***
Tenure*100 0.14*** 0.04*** -0.34***
# employees*100 -0.02 -0.01 -0.20***
Profession 0.36*** 0.29*** -1.08***
Art and literacy 0.07* 0.20*** 0.34***
Executive 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.24***
Engineer 0.10** 0.21*** 0.76***
Clergy -0.35 -0.32** 0.96
Tertiary intermediate profession -0.11*** -0.07*** 0.04
Technician -0.18*** -0.07*** 0.27***
White-collar -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.08**
Qualiﬁed worker -0.30*** -0.24*** 0.17***
Non-qualiﬁed worker -0.33*** -0.31*** 0.38***
Fixed term -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.44***
Trainee -0.08*** -0.17*** -0.41***
Apprentice -0.60*** -0.53*** 0.74***
Part time -0.04*** -0.02** 0.20***
Zus -0.03* -0.04*** -0.10**
Father:
Farmer, craftsman, storekeeper, entrepreneur -0.01





Farmer, craftsman, storekeeper, entrepreneur 0.15***








Note: * Signiﬁcant at 90%, ** Signiﬁcant at 95% and *** Signiﬁcant at 99%. This
estimation is controlled for living area, occupations, type of contract and economic sector.
Source: INSEE, Paris.
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